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ABSTRACT 
The recent spate of strikes in the mining sector in South Africa has created a 
perceived nervousness amongst shareholders. Within the mining sector in South 
Africa, gold mining is of significance historically and economically.  This study aims 
to assess the impact of strikes on shareholder value in the gold mining industry 
during the period beginning January 2007 and December 2012, and  uses the 
popular event study methodology developed by Ball and Brown (1968). The effect of 
the announcement and duration of the strike on the share price was tested.  
Significant negative cumulative abnormal returns were observed during the 
announcement of the strike.  The impact of the announcement of protected strikes 
compared to unprotected strikes on the share price was compared. Although both 
types of strikes had a negative impact on shareholder value, an unprotected strike 
had less of an impact on shareholder value compared to a protected strike.  This 
observation is of particular significance given the recent increase in unprotected 
strikes.  Strikes with a duration of 15 days or longer resulted in smaller negative 
cumulative abnormal returns as opposed to strikes which lasted for less than 15 
days. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The mining industry contributes significantly to the South African Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) annually (8.5% of the 2011 GDP) and in recent days has been 
affected by serious strike action both legalised, and controlled by the registered 
unions as well as illegal wildcat strikes (Chamber of Mines South Africa, 2012; 
Reuters, 2012). Within the mining sector, the gold mining industry in South Africa not 
only holds historical value but has also contributed on average 21.1% per annum of 
the mining income to the GDP from 2002 to 2011 thus making it an important 
economic sector in South Africa (Chamber of Mines South Africa, 2012).  
The South African unionised labour market is particularly active when it comes to 
wage negotiations which often results in strike action, however in recent days we 
have seen extraordinary increase in illegal strikes in addition to legal strikes (Gold 
Fields Limited, 2012).  Strikes cause a disruption in production, but the net effect of 
the strike action on the value of the company is still uncertain. Protected (unionised) 
strikes in the mining sector are a common annual occurrence in South Africa, with an 
average of 1 030 workdays lost per annum for every 100 workers from 2007 to 2011, 
where the unions negotiate for higher wage rates in order to benefit union members 
(Department of Labour, 2011).  Official statistics regarding the workdays lost due to 
illegal strikes have not been documented by the Department of Labour.  However 
companies disclose these losses in their annual reports and press statements. One 
example is that of Gold Fields, which disclosed in a recent press statement that more 
than half of its workers (a total compliment of 40 000 workers) have been on strike; 
as a result, they estimate that approximately “35 000 troy ounces of gold production” 
was lost in the third quarter, ending 30 September 2012 (MacDonald, 2012).  
AngloGold reiterated the bleak situation when it stated that it has lost “30 000 to  
32 000 ounces a week” (Cooke, 2012). From 2 October 2012 until 23 October 2012, 
Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited recorded a loss of 20 days of production, 
which translates into 13 000 ounces of gold; this led to management giving the 
employees an ultimatum to either return to work or be fired (Harmony Gold Mining 
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Company Limited, 2012a).  The strike action observed in recent days threatens the 
profitability and production of marginal gold mines in South Africa.  There is a 
possibility that some of these mines will require closure, which will, in turn result in 
job losses (MacDonald, 2012).  This statement was confirmed by the Chief Executive 
Officer of AngloGold Ashanti, Mark Cutifani, when he said, "If the current unprotected 
strike continues, it compounds the potential likelihood of a premature downsizing of 
AngloGold Ashanti's South African operations" (AngloGold Ashanti Limited, 2012). 
Summarising the purpose of this study, Neumann and Reder (1984) state that “the 
plain fact is that we do not know whether losses resulting from labour disputes are 
big or small or even if there are any”.  The recent strike at Lonmin plc’s Marikana 
mine, in particular, appears to have signalled a potential turning point in employer-
employee relations in the mining sector. 
 
1.1 Research Objectives and hypotheses  
The objective of this research is to evaluate the effect of labour strikes on 
shareholder wealth (which could indicate profitability of the company) in gold mining 
companies in South Africa, using all gold mining companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) during the period January 2007 to December 
2012. Specifically the following hypotheses are articulated: 
Hypothesis One (H1A): Protected strikes in the gold mining industry have a negative 
impact on share prices 
(H10): There is no impact of protected strike activity in the gold mining industry on the 
share price. 
Hypothesis Two (H2):  Unprotected strikes in the gold mining industry have a 
negative impact on share prices.  
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(H20): there is no impact of the unprotected strike activity in the gold mining industry 
on the share price. 
Hypothesis Three (H3): Settlement of strikes in the gold mining industry has a 
positive impact on the share price. 
 (H30): There is no effect of settlement of strike activity in the gold mining industry on 
the share price. 
Hypothesis Four (H4): The duration period of gold mine strikes is negatively 
associated with its share price value  
 (H40): There is no association between the duration of gold mine strikes and share 
price value  
1.2 Context and Significance of the study 
The Labour Relations Act of 1995 allowed for collective bargaining as an important 
key determinant of an amicable labour relationship, by providing organisation rights 
to unions, and the continued provision for centralised bargaining councils.  The 1995 
Act promoted centralised bargaining reflected in the provision for statutory councils, 
and the provision that when arbitrating on the organisation rights of unions, 
commissioners should have a view to orderly collective bargaining in the industry or 
sector. However, even though the Labour Relations Act was introduced and 
implemented after 1995, South Africa lost 125 000 man days in the first half of 2000 
through both legal and illegal strike action (Andrew Levy and Associates, 2012);  if 
socio-economic stay away actions are included, then the figures can reach a million 
man days (Bendix, 2000).   
The mineral resources of a country are tied to the wealth of the country and, in turn, 
its citizens and other stakeholders, such as shareholders/investors (PWC, 2011).  
One method of distribution of this wealth is through employment.  Should the 
marginal mines be closed due to low production − as indicated by both AngloGold 
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and Gold Fields − many jobs will be lost (Cooke, 2012; MacDonald, 2012).  Since 
many of the recent strikes are illegal, companies have had to resort to drastic action 
by firing those who refuse to return to work (Cooke, 2012).  As a result, the 
unemployment rate will soar, adding to the already stretched South African social tax 
burden.  
It is not only the tax burden that is a serious problem, but also the possible lack of 
foreign investment, which is an additional risk when profitability drops. This risk is 
highlighted by the fact that Standard and Poor’s, a credit-rating agency dropped 
South Africa’s sovereign rating “to reflect the deterioration in the social and economic 
environment” (Cooke, 2012:23). This drop in confidence in the country was coupled 
with a lowered rating by Moody’s in September 2012, when they dropped their rating 
in South African Government bonds due to the unprotected strikes (Steyn , 2012). 
This rating drop will have a significant impact on foreign investors, such as the large 
American Pension Funds (Steyn , 2012). 
When employees strike, there is a definite effect on the income of the employees 
and the shareholders, and in South Africa this industry is one of the key industries 
that bring in export income.  By extending previous studies to the gold mining sector 
specifically, decision-makers − on the side of both the labourers and the 
shareholders − will make better informed decisions relating to the wage negotiations. 
 
1.3 Definition of terms 
The significant terms used in this study are defined as follows: 
 Average Abnormal Return (AAR) – The average of the abnormal returns 
observed during the event window. 
 Abnormal returns - The excess returns experienced over and above the 
normal return (De Jong, 2007). The Investor  Dictionary (2012) defines 
abnormal returns as a term used by market traders to describe the difference 
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between a single share’s performances in comparison to the average market 
performance over a set period of time. 
 Alpha – The Investor  Dictionary (2012) defines alpha as a risk-adjusted 
measure of the “excess return” on an investment. It further states that the 
difference between the fair and actually expected rates of return on a stock is 
called the stock’s’ ‘alpha’.  A ‘stock’ being a share in a company. 
 Beta – Defined by the Investor  Dictionary (2012), beta is a statistical measure 
of the relative volatility of a stock, fund, or other security in comparison to the 
market as a whole. 
 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) - Farlex (2013) describes the CAR of a 
share as the sum of all the differences between the expected returns and the 
actual returns up to a given point in time. 
 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) – The average of the CAR 
during the event window. 
 Estimation window – This is the period within the test period where the 
estimates for the event study are calculated. 
 Event study methodology – This is a methodology that attempts to measure 
the valuation effects of a corporate event, such as a strike announcement, by 
inspecting the reaction of the share price around the announcement of the 
event (Fisher, 2011) 
 Event window – This is a period within the test period where the abnormal 
returns around the event for the event study are calculated. 
 Normal Returns – The average return over some defined period of time. (De 
Jong, 2007) 
 Observational Period – This is the period, related to the strike announcement 
that incorporates the estimated event window periods that share price data 
will be obtained for each listed company (De Jong, 2007). 
 Strike – Workers refusal to work because of a disagreement over pay or 
conditions (Oxford, 2011).  In the context of this study, the protected strikes 
are those where employees have complied with section 64 of the Labour 
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Relations Act (LRA) unless different procedures are provided for in a 
collective agreement which is binding on employees organised by a mining 
union in South Africa and unprotected strikes are those other than protected 
strikes (Norton Rose Global, 2009). 
 Thin trading – Thin trading is described by (Invest Word, 2013) as a day’s 
trading where not many shares are offered for sale. 
 Secondary data - InvestorWords (2013) defines secondary data as Data that 
has previously been collected (primary data) that is utilized by a person other 
than the one who collected the data. 
 Securities Exchange News Service (SENS) – According to the JSE, “SENS is 
a system provided by the JSE, which disseminates corporation 
announcements and price sensitive information, i.e. mergers, takeovers, rights 
offers, capital issues, cautionary announcements, etc., all of which have an 
impact on the share price movement in the market.” 
 
1.4 Assumptions 
Several assumptions have been made in order to control the fact that several 
variables could affect the conclusions drawn from the data. These assumptions are 
considered valid and reasonable and are listed below: 
 Share price volatility is a correct measure of the market’s response and 
reflects all relevant information (Fama, Fisher, and Jenson, 1969; McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997). 
 The market processes information about the event in an efficient and 
unbiased manner. (Fisher, 2011) 
 Gold mining shares are well traded and highly liquid. 
 Decisions made by management are made with the intention of increasing 
shareholders’ wealth.  (Abowd, 1989) 
 The data obtained from the Department of Labour is complete and accurate. 
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 The SENS announcements are complete in terms of the unprotected strike 
dates and information. 
 The market processes information about the event in an efficient and 
unbiased manner. (Fisher, 2011) 
 The event study methodology is based on the premise that new information 
like the announcement of a strike will initiate an immediate reaction from 
investors. (De Jong, 2007; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Seiler, 2000) 
1.5 Limitations of the study 
Due to the wide spectrum of variables that affect investor decision making there are 
significant limitations to this study.  These limitations are listed below: 
The event study methodology relies on the assumption of the efficient market (Fama, 
1970).  This assumption is not always valid. 
The event study methodology studies the short run impacts of an event on 
shareholders only. The long run impact is not considered as a result is not 
investigated. 
Share price may incorporate more information than just the market’s response to the 
strike.  Should another event affect the share price, this was investigated using 
media reports, SENS announcements and published quarterly or annual reports of 
the affected company.  This was then taken into account when analysing the data. 
Sample may not reflect the true situation with regards to the market’s response as it 
is only reflective of listed mining companies. 
Some companies in the population may not be on the Top 40 list of the JSE listed 
companies but rather on the AltX exchange which may mean that their market index 
funding may drop.  This does will not necessarily impact the study as the data will be 
indexed before analysing. 
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Only the share price is assessed for each company without due deliberation on the 
impact on other social partners and the community at large.  
 
1.6 Delimitations of the study 
This study excludes: 
 Companies not listed on the JSE. This is because of the expected availability 
and quality of the data desired. 
 Analysing the strategic reason for the strike duration for each separate 
company. The intention of this study is to analyse factual findings and not to 
add normative value. 
 All other analysis regarding company specifics (e.g. size) will not be carried 
out as this paper intends on focusing only on gold mining companies listed on 
the JSE. 
 This study acknowledges that strikes are not the only reason for share price 
fluctuations, but based on the methodology one can assume that the 
fluctuation around the strike will relate mainly to the strike as the event being 
studied. 
 The study does not take into account occurrences where successful 
negotiations have taken place between the union and employer as they do not 
result in a strike. 
 This study does not analyse exact costs of the strike at company level which 
will include loss of employees, loss of suppliers, other labour costs like 
overtime or contract workers and a potential loss of customers. 
 The profile of investors has not been investigated as this study focuses on the 
wealth effects of shareholders as a whole. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction and Background 
As cited by Becker and Olson (1986)  Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) identified 
work stoppages as the most important public issue relating to trade unionism as their 
impact is so great on the economy.  Focussing locally, in the First Quarter 2013 
review, the Chief Executive of Harmony Gold stated the following (Harmony Gold 
Mining Company Limited, 2012b):  
“The past quarter has been a tumultuous time in the mining industry after 
unprotected strikes at one platinum mine spread across almost the entire mining 
industry, including our own Kusasalethu mine.  In addition to the tragic loss of life at 
some operations in the mining industry and the economic cost of these actions, the 
scale of violence and intimidation has made media headlines around the world with 
concomitant impacts on investor sentiment, South Africa's sovereign credit rating, 
and national and industry reputations.  These events have been extremely 
unfortunate, not only for the industry and its employees, but also for future growth 
and development in South Africa, given the critical role of gold mining in our country's 
economic development.”  
Strike action in the gold mining industry in South Africa can be problematic and 
costly.  However, the real loss to shareholders has not been investigated.  This 
statement highlights the need to study the impact of the strikes on the gold mining 
industry in South Africa.  In order to do this, an understanding of the circumstances 
that lead to the strike action needs to be obtained. 
Management has a fiduciary duty to safeguard shareholder assets and, hence, 
manage costs appropriately (Companies Act No. 71 of 2008, s77).  This principle is 
reiterated in literature where management goals should be shareholder wealth 
maximisation (Greer, Martin, and Reusser, 1980).  Furthermore good corporate 
governance principles indicate that management should be transparent in their 
decision making and accountable to actions taken (Rossouw, van der Watt and 
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Rossouw, 2002) As such, management is always careful about giving in to labour 
demands, as this increases labour costs and, subsequently, production costs.  As a 
result, management decisions at union negotiations and strike action affect 
shareholder value (Bhana, 1997; Nelson, Amoako-Adu, and Smith, 1994). When 
wage negotiations are entered into, management has one of two options: either to 
negotiate and meet the demands of the unions, or allow their employees to embark 
on a strike.  This decision should be a calculated decision based on their fiduciary 
duty − that is, the option which will result in best safeguarding the shareholders’ 
assets should be adopted (Bhana, 1997).  However, as noted by Bazerman, 
Giuliano, and Appleman (1984), this does not always occur, thus resulting in greater 
losses for the shareholders.  These losses have been mentioned by Greer et al. 
(1980) as the loss of profits in the short run, loss in the market due to possible loss of 
customers, damage to property, plant and equipment among others, shareholders 
drop in the evaluation of management, damaged labour relationships and overall 
damage to the company’s reputation. 
Several studies have looked at overall strike action in different countries and their 
effect on the share prices of the affected companies thus measuring the loss due to 
the strike. The results of many of these studies have shown that the market 
anticipates the strike and share prices drop before the strike action, and after the 
strike some shareholder value is lost overall (Nelson et al., 1994).  However, the 
share price does drop further after the strike announcement, indicating that the 
market is not efficient in its knowledge and there is further shareholder value lost 
(Bhana, 1997; Nelson et al., 1994).  Further studies were conducted to determine if 
the length of the strike affected shareholder value.  Results showed that strikes that 
lasted longer than 10 days had a lower negative effect on shareholder value, as 
opposed to strikes that lasted less than 10 days, which had a more significant effect 
(Greer et al., 1980). 
Firstly, most of these studies were conducted in first world countries where the 
political stability of the country is not questioned; hence, the economic environment 
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and investing habits of investors are not the same as those in South Africa (Greer et 
al., 1980; Nelson et al., 1994; Neumann and Reder, 1984).   
Secondly, many of these studies have been performed in markets which are 
dominated by the manufacturing industry, which has a different labour supply to the 
gold mining industry (Bhana, 1997).  Bhana (1997) confirms that the losses − even 
though they seem significant in the manufacturing industry overall − seem 
insignificant due to this industry’s ability to draw on finished inventory on hand. 
Thirdly, one study has been performed in South Africa; however, this study was 
performed prior to South Africa becoming a democracy and was also performed on 
the JSE as a whole (Bhana, 1997). 
 
2.2 Strike Action in South Africa 
Strike action in South Africa began in 1946 in the Witwatersrand when African mine 
workers on a gold mine went on strike for a more equitable wage (South African 
History Online towards a people's history, 2013).  This marked the beginning of the 
fight by mine workers in South Africa. The main motivation was to fight the economic 
and moral imbalances resulting from apartheid. The primary group of workers 
belonging to unions at the time were the ‘impoverished black worker’, who needed 
the voice of collective bargaining to ‘speak’ on his behalf (Bhana, 1997).  Today, 
these imbalances still exist, resulting in strike action still continuing. 
Collective bargaining and strike activity − if legal − should not always be seen as a 
negative occurrence, as it is a sign of a healthy economy where negotiation and 
communication can take place.  It can be used as a psychological outlet for 
employees to rid themselves of bitterness built over the period from the last wage 
negotiation, by being seen and having their voices heard (Bhana, 1997).  In addition 
the fact that employees go on strike should highlight to shareholders that 
management may possibly not be acting with the correct corporate social 
12 
 
responsibility that is required by not paying a minimum ‘living wage’ (Industry 
Canada, 2012)  However, the unprotected (illegal) strike action witnessed in recent 
days in South Africa has been coupled with violence and intimidation, which then 
adds to the negative impact on the affected companies and on the South African 
economy (Steyn , 2012). 
Strikes are defined by Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) as follows: 
“The partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction 
of work, by persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by 
different employers, for the purpose of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute 
in respect of any matter of mutual interest between employer and employee, and 
every reference to “work” in this definition includes overtime work, whether it is 
voluntary or compulsory” ("Labour Relations Act," 1995). 
According to Norton Rose Global (2009), there is a distinction between protected 
and unprotected strikes. “In order for a strike to be protected, the employees must 
comply with section 64 of the LRA unless different procedures are provided for in a 
collective agreement which is binding on employees.”   
In recent days, there has been an unprecedented spark of unprotected strikes, which 
are strikes embarked on by employees when all the provisions of the Act are not 
met.  Employees are protected under the law in terms of job retention during 
protected strikes.  However during unprotected strikes employers have the legal right 
to dismiss through the court process where employees do not return to work.(Norton 
Rose Global, 2009)   
During unprotected strikeslegal procedures are not  followed, thus employers are not 
able to adequately prepare for the strike action, resulting in a possible larger loss 
than what could occur under a protected strike, where procedure allows sufficient 
time for employers to put controls into place in order to minimise loss (Israelstam,  
2013).  
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As stated in a recent article published by Times Live (2012), Bankserv Africa 
believes that “[t]he current spate of illegal and unprotected strikes may be a game-
changer for South Africa's economy”.  All previous studies in this field have looked at 
legal strikes only.  Recent reports from affected companies state their losses due to 
the illegal strikes.   
Gold Fields in their recent media release of the reviewed preliminary condensed 
consolidated results for the quarter and year ended 31 December 2012 annual report 
has stated the effects of the illegal strikes.  Strikes at their KDC and Beatrix mines 
resulted in a loss of 110, 000 ounces of lost production, with a total drop in 
production of 7 percent.  A total of 79 production days were lost by the company.  
The impact of these strikes as stated in this report by the Chief Executive Officer, 
Nick Holland, extends further than the production loss and related cash cost.  It has 
impacted firstly on a company level the trust factor in employer-employee 
relationship resulting in management having to relook at the manner in which this 
relationship is managed, but secondly on a wider scale has impacted South Africa 
significantly.  Not only has the country lost valuable and much needed tax revenue 
but more importantly has lost investor confidence.  It is this confidence and thus cash 
injection that South Africa sorely needs to create jobs and achieve their longer term 
national development projects.  He further reiterated that should government not 
revisit their management of the industry, it’s attractiveness will drop in the eyes of the 
much needed investor.(Gold Fields Limited, 2013) 
AngloGold Ashanti reported in their Report for the quarter and year ended 31 
December 2012 a loss of $208million.  This lost resulted in them having to increase 
debt by one billion rands to maintain the business (AngloGold Ashanti Limited, 
2013).  The debt matures over tranches in the next two years thus highlighting the 
longer term cost of the illegal strikes. 
Harmony Gold reported a loss of 9% of gold production in quarter 4 as a result of the 
illegal strike at their Kusasalethu mine.  This drop in production has led to 
management reassessing the viability of the mine as a going concern.  The deadline 
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to decide whether or not to reopen this mine is the 7th of March 2013  (Harmony Gold 
Mining Company Limited, 2013). The fact that management is willing to close the 
mine due to the strike has highlighted that the illegal strike has not only caused a 
severe cost to the business but also the possible loss of much needed jobs. 
Other factors like the escalating cost of electricity with the increase in employee 
wage and other costs imposed on the industry by government has had a serious 
negative impact on the mining industry in South Africa as a whole (Gold Fields 
Limited, 2013). 
The impact felt by these mining giants by the recent unprotected strikes highlights 
the importance of this study.  In a recent article Norton Rose Global (2012) advise 
employers to not solely rely on union bargaining for wage negotiation.  When times 
are tough employees have appeared to be willing to take up the threat of dismissal to 
have their views heard.  The impact on business as a result has been detrimental as 
noted in the annual reports of each of South Africa’s affected mining companies.  
This study has as a secondary analysis explored the difference in the impact of a 
protected compared to an unprotected strike on the share price. 
 
2.3 Strike Action in foreign countries 
Strike action is not unique to South Africa or to the mining sector.  2012 has seen 
strike action in USA with the biggest retailer experiencing strikes over low wages and 
inferior employment conditions, despite their efforts to derail unionisation in earlier 
years (Hines and Miles, 2012; Lee  and Mas , 2009)  In the education sector, 
teachers both in the USA and Britain went on strike in 2012 over wage and 
employment conditions (Harrison , 2012;Zhao, 2012).  Also during 2012 BHP Billiton 
Mitsubishi Alliance in Queensland, Australia experienced striking action due to 
employees being unhappy over wage levels and other employment conditions 
(Honan , 2012).  BHP Billiton has faced closure of mines in Queensland during 2012 
due to escalating production costs and low commodity prices which then gets 
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severely aggravated by strikes (Ker , 2012).  Most recently reports state that striking 
action in China is on the increase and has not been limited to a specific industry 
(Hurst, 2013).  The impact of strikes on shareholder value has not been studied on a 
specific industry and in more detail the difference between protected and 
unprotected strikes has not been studied at all even though unprotected strikes are 
not a phenomenon to South Africa, like the recent threat of unprotected strikes in 
Queensland, Australia by nurses threatened with possible job losses (Helbig , 2012)  
 
2.4 How is shareholder value measured? 
In order to assess the actual shareholder value, one needs to understand the finance 
principles that determine share prices.  Embedded in finance literature is the 
principle that capital markets are efficient and that the value of the company is a 
representation of the present value of the company, in terms of the expected future 
cash flows that will be derived from the currently-held assets of the company being 
the inherent value of the company (Becker and Olson, 1986; Hadassin, 1985).  If the 
value of the assets of the company has not changed, yet the share price changes, 
this must be an indication that other elements are taken into account − other than the 
current assets held − when determining the shareholder value.  This paper will be 
looking at one element: labour relations and related strike action.   
Well known in finance literature is the theory developed by Miller and Modigliani 
(1961), where the authors assert that for a company’s value to increase it must make 
investments that have a positive net present value and these investments will drive 
the future earnings of the company.  Should the strike reduce the future earnings of 
the company then the share price should drop at the time of the strike, because 
financial markets are forward looking and that all expected disturbances in future 
cash flows should be immediately discounted back to their present value and 
reflected in an immediate adjustment of the current share price. Alfred Marshall’s 
seminal work of 1890 in economics used a partial equilibrium model which may also 
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be applied to the labour market.  When using the model, the individual represents 
the supplier  of labour and employers the consumers, attempting to buy labour as 
demand for labour.  Here equilibrium would be obtained at a price that matches the 
supply and demand for labour. Although this model may hold true in some markets, 
South Africa has unique circumstances that may upset this natural  equilibrium.  
These circumstances include particularly strong trade unions, rigid rules about hiring 
and firing, and minimum wage requirements- all of which may tip the balance in 
favour of the individuals already employed (on the supply side) in spite of the high 
levels of unemployment in the country. 
Management of the company should thus strive to effectively negotiate during the 
bargaining process in order to avert a costly strike, thus providing the best return 
possible to the shareholder. 
2.5 The relationship between the share price and strikes 
There are several ways that one could analyse the relationship between the share 
price and strikes. Firstly, one could look to the microeconomic principles of company 
value maximisation. In terms of microeconomics, companies will reach a natural 
equilibrium when the supply and demand of labour equates. According to the 
principle of partial equilibrium developed by Alfred Marshall, this point will be 
reached at the wage that the worker is willing to accept and the employer willing to 
pay (Byrns, 2011). At this point the marginal revenue per product is said to be 
maximised. However, when unions enter wage negotiations, the wage rate is 
increased and, hence, the equilibrium point is disturbed; that is all factors in the 
partial equilibrium have not been held constant.  The company then has two options: 
(i) produce at a lower marginal revenue per product, or (ii) reduce labour (Case and 
Fair, 1996).  Other factors like protective labour law also contribute to the 
disturbance of the desired labour market equilibrium. 
Secondly, one could analyse the effect of the share price based on the basic impact 
on the business.  The lack of labour, due to strike action, disrupts production, which 
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in turn lowers inventory levels.  When inventory levels are low, sales are low (Nelson 
et al., 1994).   In the case of the South African mining industry, this translates into 
lower export levels, which means lower overall GDP levels for the country.  Clearly 
from the statement cited earlier by the CEO of Gold Fields, this impact has been felt 
by South Africa in 2012. 
Thirdly, one could look at the relationship between the share price and strikes, and 
view strikes as an investment decision on the side of management.  The future 
benefit for the company needs to result in an increase in the future cash flows to the 
company.  These future cash flows is what an investor looks at when interested in 
the rate of return from their investment (Greer et al., 1980).  When the strike 
decreases these future cash flows, it can be viewed as a negative future cash flow 
and, as such, management should attempt to prevent the strike from occurring.  
However, should the bargaining process and strike result in the company having to 
pay less in future in terms of labour costs, then this may be viewed as a positive 
investment, as the long run benefits would outweigh the short run cost of the strike 
(Bhana, 1997; Greer et al., 1980). 
Therefore share price movements indicate market and, hence, investor sentiment.  
Research has shown that even in an inefficient market, announcements such as 
strike activity can result in share price movements (DiNardo  and Hallock , 2000; 
Teoh, Welch, and Wazzan, 1999).   
 
2.6 Previous Research 
Bhana (1997) studied the effect of strikes from 1984 to 1993 on all companies which 
were listed on the JSE; he studied all strikes that took place during that period and 
the effect they had on share prices in the short term.  His results show that in the 
short run, companies incur losses and don’t recover the losses after the strike has 
terminated, hence shareholder value decreases.  In this way, he was able to assess 
the overall value lost due to strikes, from 1984 to 1994.  Bhana (1997) also explains 
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that if strikes are viewed as investments on the side of management of the affected 
companies, managers must then determine the cost of the investment being the 
strike.  If this cost is a negative investment, then management must attempt to 
prevent strikes, in light of the fact that they have a fiduciary duty to ensure 
safeguarding of assets on behalf of the shareholders.     
This study by Bhana (1997) was carried out during the apartheid era in South Africa; 
since then, no study has been performed, particularly in the mining sector, linking 
strikes to shareholder value.  
Other studies around the effect of strikes on share prices have indicated that one of 
the shortcomings is that these studies are not industry-specific (Gramm, 1986).  
Many studies performed abroad relate to manufacturing industries rather than the 
mining industry (Bhana, 1997; Neumann and Reder, 1984).  Another aspect of the 
studies in the manufacturing industry is that output is not greatly affected (Bhana, 
1997).  Yet, the studies that analyse the effects of strikes show that a negative effect 
occurs overall, which means that the underlying loss must relate to a different 
industry (i.e. not the manufacturing industry).  It was noted by Becker and Olson 
(1986) that strikes cost the market substantially but these costs varied across 
industries that were included in their study. 
Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) found that efficient contract models help determine 
expectations regarding the effect of strikes on the firm.  Using these models, they 
claim that the union is aware that the firm has economic profits and wants to claim 
those profits for its members.  Therefore, a successful strike would mean that the 
share of the profits has been transferred to the workers, resulting in a decrease in 
the shareholder value of the firm; in other words, the effect of the strike on the value 
of the firm will be proportional to the change in profits going to the firm. This was 
reiterated by Bhana (1997) when he cited: “Eaton (1972) showed that strikes tend to 
be good investments for unions and poor investments for corporations.” 
However, in their study, Nelson (1986) found that a strike action could have a 
positive impact on shareholders if the company has a high level of finished goods 
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inventory, thereby allowing inventory to reach an optimal level due to the strike 
action.  A possible reason is that the manufacturing industry is more capital intensive 
than the mining industry, in relation to its dependence on production.  Gold mines do 
not generally hold finished stock; for example, once the ore has been processed, it is 
formed into a gold bar, which is the finished product, and is almost immediately sold 
and dispatched to the refinery.  In contrast, in the manufacturing industry, the 
producer may hold stock based on their demand levels and business model. 
Greer et al. (1980) found that strikes which occur for a shorter period of time have a 
more negative impact on the share price of the company than strikes which continue 
for a longer period of time. Greer et al. (1980) also found that companies  with longer 
strike action experienced an increase in the share price prior to the strike, before 
declining after the strike date. They concluded that the reason for the former 
movement in the share price was due to the fact that unions gain from short strikes 
and lose from long strikes, as most large, more profitable companies have the ability 
to withstand union demand and allow the strike to continue because they have the 
financial resources.  It is these strong financial resources that the workers seek to 
take benefit from. The authors further explained that when management are willing 
to allow the strike to continue for a long period they must see longer term benefits to 
the company and are therefore willing to incur the short term cost of the strike.  This 
means that unions maybe accepting lower long term wage without realising the 
impact on workers in the long run and the benefit to firms in the long term.   
However in a study performed by Bhana (1997), he  cited Chermesh (1982) 
observing that longer strikes seemed to result in a higher cost to the shareholder, 
unless management had other motivations to allow the strike to pursue, such as 
eliminating the unions’ bargaining power.  His results showed for the JSE listed 
companies that longer strikes directly affected the share price, resulting in a higher 
cost to the shareholder compared to shorter strikes.  Furthermore a study performed 
by DiNardo  and Hallock  (2000) shows that longer strikes, violent strikes and strikes 
that impact the whole industry have a more negative impact on share prices, like 
those witnessed in recent days in the mining industry.  The authors observed that 
20 
 
when strikes occurred on one company in an industry the loss to shareholder wealth 
was not as severe, in other words unions lost, as opposed to when strikes impacted 
a full industry, like the recent 2012 strikes. 
3 DATA AND METHOD 
3.1 Data and Population 
This paper gathers empirical evidence of the effect of strikes by workers on the share price 
of the affected gold mining company which is listed on the JSE during the period between 
January 2007 and December 2012. The population entails all JSE listed gold mining 
corporations.  
A list of protected strike dates, companies affected and the mining industry that it relates to 
was obtained from the Department of Labour (DOL), and was used to gather information on 
dates and duration of protected strikes that have affected gold mining companies listed on 
the JSE during the 6 year period.  SENS announcements for the 6 year period for all gold 
mining companies were obtained from the McGregor BFA online database.  Dates and 
affected companies for unprotected strikes were obtained from these announcements.  
For both protected and unprotected strike dates the closing share price for each day in the 
test period was obtained from the McGregor BFA online database.  This was captured on an 
excel spread sheet that was imported into the statistical package, SPSS to perform the 
statistical analysis. 
 
3.2 Sample 
A total of thirty strike events were included in the sample.  Of the thirty strikes sixteen 
were protected and fourteen were unprotected. Strikes that occurred in more than 
one mine within a mining company with the same strike dates were recorded as a 
single strike.  These were however recorded as separate strikes by the DOL as the 
mines are separate legal entities.  This was a sufficient sample size for the event 
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study methodology to be effective and yield unbiased results that can be 
extrapolated and generalised to the larger population (Gramm. 1986). 
 
3.3 Procedure for data collection and management 
The data related to the protected strike announcements was obtained from DOL 
records, and data related to unprotected strikes was sourced from the SENS 
announcements, the Business Day and other financial publications. Data was sorted 
using an Excel spread sheet. The volume of shares traded of the affected shares 
was recorded as additional variables in the same spread sheet. The data was then 
imported into a statistics package (SPSS) where it was sorted to align the variables.  
 
3.4 Method 
This research aims to add to existing knowledge around the impact on shareholders’ 
wealth of strikes in the South African gold mining industry.  The methodology that is 
used is a quantitative methodology called the Event Study methodology.  
The Event Study methodology was developed by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama 
et al according to Bowman (1983), this methodology is used to study a range of 
events that affect company share prices and is often used in financial research. This 
methodology determines whether or not there is an abnormal share price effect 
associated with an unanticipated event (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) Studies 
performed by Abowd (1989); Becker and Olson (1986); Bhana (1997) and Nelson et 
al. (1994) have used the Event Study methodology in similar studies with similar 
research objectives.  
This method is based on the premise that markets operate efficiently and therefore 
investors immediately incorporate any new information that changes the distribution 
of expected future cash flows, into the current share price. This mechanism of 
efficient markets allows the full future impact of a current event to be observed in 
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changes in the current price. (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Reinganum, 1985).  The 
speed at which the share price reacts to the event provides strong information as to 
how efficient the market is (Brown and Warner, 1985). 
This study assumes relative economic efficiency in as much as it is expected that the 
full impact of the strikes will be reflected in the share price of these highly liquid 
shares, within 30 trading days.  This is assumed as news of the strike activity often 
reaches the market prior to the actual announcement of the strike.  The 30 day 
window period was extensively studied by Becker and Olson (1986) where the 
authors compared their study to the study performed by Neumann (1980).  In their 
study they found that a longer window period of 30 days prior to announcement and 
30 days post settlement of the strike was more appropriate to measure the 
cumulative abnormal return to the investor compared to the 14 days prior to 
announcement studied by Neumann (1980).  The 30 day window period was then 
used and confirmed as appropriate by Bhana (1997).  This is necessary as the 
bargaining process is often covered by the media as a result the announcement of 
the strike event is not new or random information to the market.  The impact of the 
announcement on the share price should be calculated cumulatively from the 
appropriate time when the news reaches the market, assumed to be 30 days based 
on the prior research (Becker and Olson, 1986; Brown and Warner, 1985).  This 
stance was confirmed by Brown and Warner (1985), where the authors reiterate the 
importance of using data prior to the event should the market have prior knowledge 
resulting in an anticipation of the event. 
Pure economic efficiency would expect the price to be fully adjusted within a single 
day. Reaction in either efficiency context will result in fluctuation in the share price 
and shareholder value.  The event in this study is the announcement by the affected 
gold mining company of their mineworker embarking on a protected strike. The idea 
of this statistical method is to find the abnormal return attributable to the strike event 
by adjusting for the return that arises from the price fluctuation of the market as a 
whole.  Because markets are assumed to be forward looking and efficient and 
abnormal returns would fully incorporate the present value of any changes to future 
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cash flow expectations. Events like strike events may result in abnormal returns due 
to increased expectations of risk or lower expected future cash flows. The volume of 
shares traded around the event window was collected and analysed. In addition 
descriptive and inferential parametric statistics were run to analyse differences 
between protected and unprotected strikes.  
 
3.4.1 The test period 
The test period consists of two parts, the event window and the estimation window 
for both the announcement of the strike and the settlement of the strike. The event 
window, corresponding to the announcement of a strike, is the period from the 
announcement of the strike and a thirty day period following the settlement of the 
strike.  Conversely, the estimation window is the 70 day period prior to the 
announcement of the strike, and the test period consists of both 30 days before and 
after the event (t0) (Bhana, 1997)  Refer to Appendix A for a visual representation of 
the test period. 
Using the theory of the efficient market, the cumulative abnormal return over the 
event window should add up to zero. The reason for this is that on initial 
announcement of the strike if share prices drops they should conversely increase 
post settlement of the strike (Becker and Olson, 1986; Bhana, 1997).  This reasoning 
was confirmed by Becker and Olson (1986) when the authors state that should the 
market be efficient, the negative abnormal returns on announcement should be 
offset by the positive abnormal returns on settlement of the strike.   For this reason it 
is important to test the abnormal returns both during the announcement and 
settlement date resulting in the chosen test period. 
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3.4.2 Normal return 
Within the Event Study Methodology there are three statistical methods of measuring 
normal return.  The first of which is the Constant Mean Return Model, the second 
being the Market Model and the last a general type of factor model.  The Market 
model is regarded as an improvement of the Constant Mean Return Model and has 
been used in previous studies to study the effect of strikes on share prices (Bhana, 
1997; Nelson et al., 1994).  The last model utilises a multivariate study which is not 
ideal when a study seeks to determine the impact of one event such as the strike 
(MacKinlay, 1997). 
Abnormal returns as defined in the market model, are used in this cross-sectional 
event study to assess the impact of the events under study on the share prices of the 
identified companies. 
In the market model, the normal return for company i on day t is calculated with the 
following formula: 
Rit = αi + βi Rmt + εit 
Where: 
 α and β are regression intercept and slope estimates, respectively, obtained from a 
least-squares regression model developed by fitting a straight line to the actual 
(observed) closing share prices in the estimation period. The ALSI index was used 
as the proxy. 
A normal return is, thus, established for each company during the event window by 
extending the value of the above equation by the market portfolio return (Rmt) for 
each respective day of the strike. Because gold mining shares in South Africa are 
well traded and highly liquid, the ordinary least-squares (OLS) method for beta 
estimation is used. 
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3.4.3 Abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return 
The difference between the actual return and the estimated return is referred to as 
the abnormal return.   The predicted returns are calculated by using the α’s and β’s 
estimated when developing the model (equation (1)) with the estimation window’s 
actual returns and the actual returns (Rit) of the event window for each company.  
The abnormal return calculation is formalised as follows: 
 (2) 
Where: 
ARi,j is the abnormal return of company i on day j; Ri,j is the actual return of company 
i on day j; NRi,j is the normal return of company i on day j. 
A total of 70 observations prior to the event available for each company were 
obtained and if we consider day zero to be the day on which the event announced 
under study was experienced in each company, then our observations will range 
from day-101 - to day 30, with day-101 to day 30 constituting the estimation period 
and day 0 to day 30 the event window.  
The cross-sectional mean abnormal return was calculated as follows: 
ܣܣܴ௧ ൌ 1ܰ෍ܣܴ௜,௧
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
The cumulative average residual method (CAR) uses as the abnormal performance 
measure the sum of each day’s average abnormal performance. A column was 
created in a table which contains the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) 
for every day in the event period.   
In order to test whether the event had an effect on the share prices, the assumption 
is that the mean CAAR would be zero in the absence of an event effect. Thus, 
testing the null hypothesis: 
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H0: Mean (CAAR) = 0  
Using a one-sample t-test will test whether the mean CAAR differ significantly from 
zero or not. 
In an efficient market, the returns on a share price will be affected by any 
announcement which could impact the share price value. Therefore the Abnormal 
Returns (AR) and CAAR will be random except when an announcement of a strike is 
made. When the strike announcement reaches the market relative to day 0, then AR 
should not be 0. If the market is able to predict the possibility of a strike the 
difference between actual and predicted returns, should have a mean value of zero, 
because the change in future cash flows will have already been incorporated into the 
price. 
All strikes which occur will result in a negative average abnormal return, this will 
result in an average deviation of the actual and predicted returns being negative due 
to the cost factor (Bhana, 1997). 
4 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Two types of events were analysed, namely protected and unprotected strikes 
affecting JSE listed gold mining companies from January 2007 until December 2012. 
The daily closing share price of thirty companies that experienced either one of these 
events was obtained from the McGregor BFA online data base.  Sixteen companies 
experienced a protected strike and fourteen companies experienced an unprotected 
strike. These share prices were collected from at least 70 days prior to the event up 
to thirty days after the event. 
Table 1 in Appendix A lists the strikes and the companies that experienced them, 
start date of the strike, duration (days) of the strike and whether it was a protected or 
unprotected strike. 
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To recap, there are 70 observations of share price values prior to the event window 
for each company and day zero is the day on which the strike event was 
experienced by each company. Thus observations will range from day -100 up to 
day 30, with day-100 to day -30 constituting the estimation period and day -30 to day 
30 the event window 
In the market model, the normal returns for company i on day t are calculated using 
the following formula: 
Rit = αi + βi Rmt + εit 
where α and β are regression intercept and slope estimates, respectively, obtained 
from an OLS regression model, and by specifying the daily return as the dependent 
variable and the ALSI as the independent market proxy index. Alpha and β model 
parameters were captured for each company and used to calculate the normal 
returns (returns that might have been expected had the strike not occurred). The 
abnormal returns (AR) for each company were then calculated by subtracting the 
normal returns from the actual returns for every day in the event period. This 
abnormal return was aggregated to produce a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 
each company.  
One company was excluded from the analyses because the market index (ALSI) 
information was not available from the BFA McGregor prior to 2007, and the 
company experienced a strike in 2006. A further company was also excluded 
because specific data constraints were violated.  
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4.1 PROTECTED STRIKES 
4.1.1 Longitudinal CAAR – Protected Strike Commencements 
By comparing the mean of the window period (In this case the mean was the CAARs 
of protected, unprotected, or total firms) with the mean of the estimate period( mean 
of estimation period is by definition because of the abnormal returns), we can 
ascertain whether, and to what extent, the various category strikes have a significant 
impact on shareholder wealth. 
Table 1 indicates intervals and days: 
-30 days to +30 days= window for the event. 
-1 day is the day before the strike starts. 
0= day of strike activity.  
1= 1 day after the strike 
1-30= 30 days after the strike 
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Table 1 –T -Test of Protected Strikes commencement and strike settlement using day 
periodical analysis. 
5 Intervals in 6 Strike Commencements (df=14) 7 Strike Settlement (df=14) 
 CAAR(%) t-Test (df) CAAR(%) t-Test (df) 
-30 to -1 -2.28 -0.927 0.62 .214  
-10 to -1 -1.22 -.568 -1.15 -.561 
-5 to -1 -1.96 -1.368 -3.14 -2.221* 
-3 -1.30 -1.935 -0.23 -.031 
-2 -0.50 -.612 -1.11 -1.316 
-1 -0.25 -.358 -0.40 -.711 
0 -0.69 -.964 -0.71 -.825 
1 -0.05 -.119 0.34 .987 
2 -0.92 -2.310* -0.99 -1.667 
3 -0.66 -.997 -0.15 -.216 
1 to 5 -3.40 -2.419* -2.55 -1.824 
1 to 10 -7.52 -3.418** -7.05 -3.478** 
1 to 30 -9.43 -1.726 -7.11 -1.509 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
*** Significant at the 0.001 level 
The fact that cumulative abnormal returns are most significant after 10 days 
suggests that markets do not immediately incorporate the new information into the 
share price but seem to take about two weeks to fully adjust. This is evident from 
Table 1.Figure 1 below shows a clear downward trend in share prices from day of 
strikes for protected strike activity. This result is consistent with hypothesis 1. 
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Figure 1 – Average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns of 
Protected strike activity. 
 
 
 
 
7.1.1 Longitudinal CAAR – Protected Settlement date 
Table 1 indicates significant positive values of (-2.221) at a 5% level, and a p value 
of <0.05, which suggest that anticipation of strike settlement, share prices have a 
negative reaction few days before settlement.  This result is inconsistent with 
hypothesis 3. This is difficult to interpret and may simply be a negative market 
reaction because of the increase in ‘sabre rattling” that occurs before strike 
settlement, from the heightening of the negotiation process. One to 10 days after 
settlement, t value =-.3.478 and the p value < 0.001 this suggests that 1-10 days 
after settlement there is a negative reaction attributed to the investor realising that 
the settlement will add cost and depreciation to shareholder value. Table 1 displayed 
that there was a significant depreciation in shares from its estimate mean in the 
period of -5 days to -1 days.  In the 5 days before the strike settlement period, there 
may be information leakage about an impending strike settlement. Again 1 to 10 
days after strike, there is a significant fall in the share price. It would seem from the 
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results in Table 1 that investors expected the event, indicating that there was some 
information which had seeped into the markets via the internet or social media 
forums which could have contributed to this spill-over effect.  Investors do not react 
as quickly to new information, or that the relevant information of the strike is not 
immediately revealed and may take some days into the strike for it to reveal its true 
implications for the investor. Information leakages would be detected in statistically 
significant negative returns in the thirty days leading up to the event. 
Figure 2 shows the strike settlement activity on protected strikes appears to have a 
strong negative CAAR for several days after the settlement has been achieved 
probably due to the expected costs and decrease in shareholder value being 
gradually incorporated into prices. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Strike settlement effects on share prices over the window period. 
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7.2 UNPROTECTED STRIKES 
7.2.1 Longitudinal CAAR – Unprotected Strike commencement 
Table 1 indicates intervals and days: 
-30 days to +30 days= window for the event. 
-1 day is the day before the strike starts. 
0= day of strike activity.  
1= 1 day after the strike 
1-30= 30 days after the strike 
Table 2 –T -Test of unprotected Strikes commencement and strike settlement using 
day periodical analysis. 
7.3 Intervals in 7.4 Strike commencement (df=13) 7.5 Strike Settlement (df=12) 
 CAAR(%) t-Test CAAR(%) t-Test 
-30 to -1 -2.218 -1.038 0.249 -.125 
-10 to -1 -0.291 -.264 -1.356 -1.373 
-5 to -1 0.382 .281 -1.215 -1.439 
-3 -0.19 -.365 -0.57 -.923 
-2 0.31 .461 -0.03 -.049 
-1 -0.11 -.162 -0.31 -.841 
0 -0.11 -.251 0.23 .377 
1 -0.70 -1.321 0.19 .265 
2 -1.06 -1.960 -0.08 -.144 
3 -0.10 -.147 -0.57 -2.066 
1 to 5 -0.14 -.133 -0.87 -1.249 
1 to 10 -0.07 -.076 0.39 .290 
1 to 30 -2.23 -1.577 -3.02 -1.935 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
*** Significant at the 0.001 level 
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Table 2 above provides a summary of the results for the different intervals during the
unprotected strike action. The returns are statistically insignificantly different from 
zero. 
 
Figure 3 below, shows a cumulative trend of average abnormal returns for 
unprotected strikes is downward sloping over the window period, so this is 
consistent with hypothesis 2. 
 
Figure 3 - Average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(unprotected) 
 
 
 
 
 
7.5.1 Longitudinal CAAR – Unprotected Settlement date 
Table 2 shows no significant relationship between strike settlement in the mean for 
CAAR for each company compared with the estimation mean for the gap analysis 
period. Figure 4 below indicates that for unprotected strike settlements, which have 
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been achieved, there is a negative effect on the CAAR from 2 days of settlement to 
30 days after the strike. This is consistent with hypothesis 3. 
 
Figure 4 – strike settlement effects on share prices over the window period. 
 
 
 
 
 
7.6 PROTECTED AND UNPROTECTED STRIKES - A COMBINED 
ANALYSIS  
To test the effect of strike activity on share prices as a whole, an analysis of 
combined protected and unprotected strike activities in the mining industry was 
undertaken. 
Table 3 indicates intervals and days: 
-30 days to +30 days= window for the event. 
-1 day is the day before the strike starts. 
0= day of strike activity.  
1= 1 day after the strike 
1-30= 30 days after the strike 
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Table 3 –T -Test of Protected and unprotected strikes commencement and strike 
settlement using day periodical analysis. 
7.6.1.1 Intervals 7.6.1.2 Strike Announcement 7.6.1.3 Strike Settlement (df=27) 
 CAAR(%) t-Test CAAR(%) t-Test 
-30 to -1 -2.251 -1.399 0.220 .123 
-10 to -1 -0.774 -.636 -1.243 -1.067 
-5 to -1 -0.829 -.831 -2.246 -2.617* 
-3 -0.76 -1.767 -0.28 -.563 
-2 -0.11 -.203 -0.61 -1.105 
-1 -0.18 -.378 -0.36 -1.052 
0 -0.41 -.968 -0.27 -.502 
1 -0.37 -1.018 0.27 .735 
2 -0.99 -3.021** -0.57 -1.370 
3 -0.39 -.826 -0.34 -.905 
1 to 5 -1.83 -1.960 -1.77 -2.163* 
1 to 10 -3.92 -2.801** -3.60 -2.527* 
1 to 30 -5.95 -2.026* -5.21 -1.995* 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
*** Significant at the 0.001 level 
Strike commencement from 1 to 10 days after the strike for combined protected and 
unprotected strike there is a significant negative effect on CAAR and also from 1 to 
30 days after the strike.  
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For the settlement, there are significant CAAR depreciation from 1 to 5 and 1-10 and 
1-30 days after settlement, suggesting that the market anticipates the additional cost 
which would depreciate share value. Table 3 indicates from 5 days to one day before 
there is a significant depreciation in CAAR suggesting that heightening of tension in 
negotiation before settlement creates a negative reaction in share price values. This 
is consistent with hypothesis 3. 
The combined analysis has shown a stronger relationship rather than the separate 
relationship of the strike activity in general on the share price value (CAAR). 
 
7.7 COMPARISON BETWEEN PROTECTED AN UNPROTECTED 
STRIKES- EFFECT ON SHARE PRICE VALUE 
An informal comparison between protected and unprotected strikes on share price 
values was undertaken.  A comparison between protected and unprotected CAAR 
strikes over the post event window period (1-30) indicated a comparatively stronger 
fall in CAAR for protected strike activity compared with unprotected strike activity 
(Figure 6).  This suggests that protected strike activity is better anticipated by the 
market, or that unions in unprotected strikes are in a worse negotiating position.  
This reaction is more pronounced than for unprotected strike activity. 
Similarly for strike settlement as is evident from Figure 7, which indicates that 
protected strike settlement have a more pronounced immediate effect on CAAR than 
unprotected strike settlement. However there is a downward trend for both CAARs 
that is for both protected and unprotected strike activity. 
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Table 4 Difference between protected average CAAR and unprotected average CAAR 
for strike announcements and Settlements 
 CAAR – Announcements CAAR – Settlements 
 Protected Unprotected Protected Unprotected 
-30 to -1 -2.28 -2.22 0.63 -0.25 
1 to 30 -9.43 -2.23 -7.11 -3.02 
 
 
Figure 6– Comparison between protected strike commencement CAARs and 
unprotected strike commencement CAARS 
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Figure 7– Comparison between protected and unprotected strike settlement CAARS 
 
 
 
 
 
7.8 STRIKE DURATION 
Another important effect of potential shareholder depreciation is the duration of strike 
action with longer duration strikes being associated with more protracted CAAR 
depreciation. An independent samples t-test using the strike duration (<15 days/>15 
days) as factor and the CAAR of the companies as dependent variable was used to 
determine whether there is a significant difference between the duration of the strike 
activities 
Table 5 and 6 indicates a significant association between length of strikes less than 
15 days duration and share price depreciation (t=-2.815.p<,0.05)  
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Table 5– One sample t-test of duration of strike which is less than 15 days- Mean 
values - One-Sample Statisticsa 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error Mean 
Announcement Event 
CAR 
19 -.1145053 .17731081 .04067789 
a. Duration (number of days) = < 15 days 
 
Table 6 - One sample t-test of duration of strike which is less than 15 days- Confidence levels
One-Sample Testa 
 Test Value = 0 
T df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Announcement 
Event CAR 
-2.815 18 .011 -.11450526 -.1999663 -.0290442
a. Duration (number of days) = < 15 days 
 
 
Table 7 and 8- shows that there is no association between length of strikes with a 
duration of more than 15 days and share price value.   
The t test indicates a significant result for the shorter duration, whereas for strikes 
which occur for more than 15 days, there is no significant result. This result is 
inconsistent with hypothesis 4. 
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Table 7– One sample t-test of duration of strike which is more than 15 days- Mean values 
One-Sample Statisticsa 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error Mean 
Announcement Event 
CAR 
10 -.0323200 .11415720 .03609968 
a. Duration (number of days) = > 15 days 
 
 
Table 8 - One sample t-test of duration of strike which is more than 15 days- Confidence levels
One-Sample Testa 
 Test Value = 0 
T df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Announcement 
Event CAR 
-.895 9 .394 -.03232000 -.1139831 .0493431
a. Duration (number of days) = > 15 days 
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Table 9 - One sample t-test for the comparison between the >15 and <15 day strikes-
Mean values 
Duration of strike 
activity 
No of 
companies 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Std Error Mean 
Less than 15 days 19 -.1055379 .18077882 .04147351 
More than 15 days 10 -.0493730 .11480041 .03630308 
 
 
Table 10 - T-test for the comparison between the >15 and <15 day strikes 
 Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 F Sig. T Df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
3.480 .073 -.888 27 .382 -.05616489 .06321353 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-
1.019 
25.827 .318 -.05616489 .05511774 
Table 9 and 10 indicate the mean difference of -.05616489 is not significantly 
different from zero. 
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This means that even though the mean CAAR for shorter strikes are more negative 
than the mean for longer strikes across the event window. Figure 8 below, 
statistically there is not enough evidence to find the difference to be significant. Not 
only is the longer duration strike not significantly more negative, but the effect of 
duration actually seems to have a negative absolute impact on CAAR. 
 
Figure 8 – Comparing the cumulative average daily abnormal returns (CAAR) in the 
event window for strikes that lasted less than 15 days and those that lasted longer 
than 15 days 
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8 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Cumulative abnormal returns are shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3.  These clearly illustrate 
that there is a negative abnormal return experienced as a result of the industrial 
strike action, that is both protected and unprotected strikes commencements and for 
the combined strikes.  The abnormal returns and the cumulative abnormal returns 
are negative. This is statistically not significant on the day of the strike, but as the 
strike continues, especially with the protected strikes, there is a perception of the 
negotiations with the unions, which means an increase in the wages of the 
mineworkers and therefore an increase in the total cost to the investors.  These 
results correlate with the results of several prior studies (Abowd, 1989; Becker and 
Olson, 1986; Bhana, 1997; Greer et al., 1980; Nelson et al., 1994).  However, with 
the illegal or unprotected strike there is no statistical significance, this suggests that 
where employers are not obligated to increase the wages of the workers or even 
retain the workers, there appears to be no overall perceived increase in the costs of 
the strike (Norton Rose Global, 2009). Therefore with regards to the first and the 
second hypotheses there is an impact on the share prices of the companies for  legal 
strikes, however there is no impact on share prices from the illegal strikes. 
 
There are specific negative connotations with strike action as delineated in the 
research, the returns indicate that management needs to be wary of strike actions 
especially as it enters day 2 and continues until day 10 (Becker and Olson, 1986; 
Bhana, 1997). The announcements of the start of a strike, has to be managed as it 
will have a negative impact on the share price of a company which translates into 
negative shareholder value.  This results from the large unexpected costs that have 
been described by Imberman (1979), which are not only the wage increase as a 
result of the strike but the other associated costs like loss of employer-employee 
relationship and other labour related costs. 
 
44 
 
Furthermore, in the study performed by Bhana (1997), the author noted that strikes 
with a longer duration had a larger negative impact on share prices unless 
management had alternative motivations other than wage negotiations.  However 
this study revealed that longer strikes had less of an impact on share prices than 
those of a shorter duration.  This observation relates to that of Greer et al.’s (1980), 
where the author also found that longer strikes had less of an impact on share prices 
than shorter strikes.  The reason for this observation given by Greer et al. (1980) is 
that often the affected companies would be those of stronger financial wealth, 
resulting in the ability to function longer in striking conditions.  Perhaps in the case of 
the mines it also allows the companies to engage in contract work thus allowing 
mining to continue during the strike. 
 
The findings of this study are of substantial importance to South African mining 
companies providing empirical evidence for companies to avert strike actions. These 
results explain that the mining industry can expect the market to react negatively to 
strike actions, thereby resulting in an overall decrease in shareholder value.  It is this 
expected shareholder value that will encourage the much needed investment in the 
South African economy which in turn translates into job creation (Harmony Gold 
Mining Company Limited, 2013). 
 
8.1 Volume Traded 
The graphs in the Appendix B, indicates that the commencement of strikes do not 
cause any significant reaction from the markets. There is a drop for some companies 
on the day of the commencement, but this is not a consistent trend for all the 
companies in the sample. Again the same occurs for the settlement of strikes, that is 
there is no significant trend or reaction to the settlement announcement of the 
strikes. 
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These results suggest that there is no major reaction from shareholders, resulting in 
a decrease in the volumes of shares traded of that firm immediately after the 
commencement of the strike event or the settlement of the strike. 
9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In line with prior research,   share prices during protected strikes tend to decrease, 
thus decreasing overall shareholder value (Bhana, 1997; Brown and Ashenfelter, 
1986; Imberman, 1979).  This decrease or loss is often attributed to management 
and shareholders perceptions of the possible cost of the strikes. These costs include 
loss of production, increased labour cost, increased contractor cost, possible loss of 
suppliers and other hidden costs. Capital markets are supposed to be efficient, and 
therefore shareholders anticipate costs related to strikes. However the event window 
of the strike, that is, from the announcement date of the strike to 30 days after the 
strike, the share prices fell steadily over the event window, and the decline was 
significantly different from zero. Other aspects of industrial strikes have to be 
considered as well, that is mediation between trade unions and management, other 
economic information which could be perceived by shareholders regarding the future 
economic position of the company. 
This study has revealed that both protected and unprotected strikes have an impact 
on the share price of the companies and thereby the shareholder value of a 
company. However the protected strikes have a more pronounced effect on the 
share prices then the unprotected strikes. This could possibly be due to reports 
being available to shareholders of possible strike action. Share trading by other 
stakeholders could also contribute to the negative market reaction to protected strike 
action. Because of the unpredictability of strike action and the duration thereof, it was 
expected that there would not be a positive reaction on day t-1, however the results 
showed a negative reaction which again suggests that strikes are not completely 
predictable.  The results also suggested that markets react more severely to strikes 
that are for shorter periods than for longer periods. Strikes which are for less than 15 
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days are more significant. This is inconsistent with previous studies and the literature 
base, and with international trends.  A possible reason for the opposite effect is that 
the shorter strikes are seen as more threatening and are also generally more violent 
here in South Africa. Also the shorter strikes which cause work stoppages have a 
tendency to recur.  
These findings also suggest that the market does react negatively to an 
announcement of an impending strike, as well as a strike settlement. However there 
is evidence empirically that the overall negative reaction to commencement date is 
far more than the negative reaction to the strike settlement date, thereby resulting in 
a decrease in overall shareholder value for the company. This study extends 
previous research on strike announcements and strike duration, however it is limited 
to only a small sample of companies, but it does confirm findings by Bhana (1997), 
Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), Greer et al. (1980) and Imberman (1979) whereby 
markets still react negatively to strike announcements, whether it is protected or 
unprotected. 
10 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study has been completed taking into account all strikes (events) which were 
embarked before 31 October 2012; however, it would be noteworthy to mention that 
unprotected strikes at the time of the results have reoccurred in the mining sector as 
a whole and in the gold mining sector of South Africa during December 2012.  This is 
the first time that unprotected strikes have been witnessed on this scale in the 
industry, with effects such as a drop in the credit rating of mining companies, in 
addition to a drop in South Africa’s rating as a country (Gold Fields Limited, 2012).  
However, as this is a new event, its full effects have not yet been felt on the 
economy as a whole; as a result, the market sentiment is that of weariness.  
This study has revealed areas where further studies can be explored in order to 
deepen the knowledge in this field.  The areas identified are listed below:  
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 a comparison of protected and unprotected strikes in other industries in South 
Africa; 
 the effects of the strike on actual production lost by the affected companies; 
 the effect on other industries and in turn, a comparison with this study to 
determine whether or not the effects are similar 
 the impact on media coverage of the strike on share price; 
 the impact of strikes on corporate social responsibility within the firm; and 
 the socio-economic effect, such as that of unemployment and the country’s 
GDP. 
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TABLE 1- Companies and lists of strikes 
Strike No Holding Company Start t0 Duration of Protected / 
1 DRD Gold Ltd 13-FEB-2007 7.0 protected 
2 Simmer and Jack Mines 09-MAY-2007 4.0 protected 
3 Anglogold Ashanti 03-DEC-2007 2.0 protected 
4 Goldfields Ltd 03-DEC-2007 2.0 protected 
5 Anglogold Ashanti 22-JUL-2008 2.0 protected 
6 Goldfields Ltd 15-JUL-2008 9.0 protected 
7 Goldfields Ltd 06-AUG-2008 1.0 protected 
8 DRD Gold Ltd 30-MAY-2008 3.0 protected 
9 Goldfields Ltd 05-JUN-2008 2.0 protected 
10 Goldfields Ltd 23-JUL-2008 1.0 protected 
11 DRD Gold Ltd 15-SEP-2009 26.0 protected 
12 Harmony Gold 14-JAN-2010 6.0 protected 
13 GoldOne International 23-MAR-2010 30.0 protected 
14 Anglogold Ashanti 28-JUL-2011 7.0 protected 
15 Anglogold Ashanti 07-MAR-2012 1.0 protected 
16 Village Main Reef 06-MAR-2012 2.0 protected 
17 Anglogold Ashanti 20-SEP-2012 39.0 Unprotected 
18 Anglogold Ashanti 25-SEP-2012 28.0 Unprotected 
19 Harmony Gold 02-OCT-2012 24.0 Unprotected 
20 Village Main Reef 27-SEP-2012 22.0 Unprotected 
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TABLE 1 continued - Companies and lists of strikes 
Strike No Holding Company Start t0 Duration of Protected / 
21 Village Main Reef 06-NOV-2012 3.0 Unprotected 
22 Village Main Reef 07-SEP-2011 35.0 Unprotected 
23 Goldfields Ltd 29-AUG-2012 8.0 Unprotected 
24 Goldfields Ltd 14-OCT-2012 24.0 Unprotected 
25 Goldfields Ltd 09-SEP-2012 40.0 Unprotected 
26 Goldfields Ltd 21-SEP-2012 26.0 Unprotected 
27 Goldfields Ltd 14-OCT-2012 11.0 Unprotected 
28 GoldOne International 01-OCT-2012 2.0 Unprotected 
29 GoldOne International 03-JUN-2012 9.0 Unprotected 
30 GoldOne International  09-MAR-2012 1.0 Unprotected 
Total N 30 30 30 30
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APPENDIX B 
Actual Volume 
Protected 
 
Unprotected 
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Standardised Volume 
Protected 
 
Unprotected 
 
